Introduction
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, then a Category 3 storm, made landfall near Buras, Louisiana. The storm produced significant rainfall in the Gulf Coast region, ranging from 8 to 12 inches (Knabb, Rhome and Brown 2005, page 10 ). This rain, combined with strong winds and severe storm surge, caused multiple failures to the Lake Pontchartrain flood protection system. These failures resulted in approximately 80 percent of the City of New Orleans being flooded. The flooding was so extensive that recovery efforts in the city and region continue to this day. 1 The flooding of New Orleans resulted in a massive and rapid exodus of individuals from New Orleans to locations around the United States. According to the RAND Corporation, the population of New Orleans went from 485,000 before Hurricane Katrina struck the city to a population of 155,000 in 2006; the "homes of about 55 percent of the city's population -268,000 people -suffered severe damage after parts of New Orleans were inundated by floodwaters more than 4 feet deep when the hurricane hit and levees were breeched" (McCarthy et al. 2006 ). This level of damage meant that individuals were not merely forced out for the duration of the hurricane and a short period after; instead, a large segment of the New Orleans population was forced out of the city for an extended period. 2 Although the general geography of New Orleans is at or below sea level, the actual extent of flooding varied across the city, based on this geography and where the breaches to the levees occurred. Studies have indicated that large sections of New Orleans were flooded by more than six feet of water, and parts of Lakeview, Gentilly, New Orleans East, and the Lower Ninth Ward were flooded with more than ten feet of water (ASCE 2007, 1 Knabb, Rhome and Brown (2005) of the National Hurricane Center, wrote that "Katrina was on of the most devastating natural disasters in United States history" (page 1). Further into their report, they note that there were dramatic storm surges in Lake Pontchartain, for example, surges of 15 to 19 feet in eastern New Orleans, and 10 to 14 feet in western New Orleans (page 9) 2 RAND estimates that in September 2008 (three years after Hurricane Katrina), the population of New Orleans will only be 56 percent of its pre-Katrina population -or 272,000 of the original population of 485,000. 32, Figure 5 .10). In Figure 1 we display the depth of the flooding for all of New Orleans by Census Block, where darker colors indicate increased flood depth.
Figure 1 Goes Here
In the midst of the hurricane recovery, the City of New Orleans held an important mayoral election. The election raised an array of questions regarding when the election should be held (if it should be postponed), under what electoral rules and procedures should the election be held, and what the implications of the population diaspora would be on the campaign and election. Arguments regarding when the election would be held were largely driven by the views that people had on what the impact of the diaspora would be on the voting population in New Orleans. With more than half of the city's population gone, the unknown was who would be able to vote.
We begin by providing a context for understanding the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, including the debate that surrounded the election and its administration, and a theoretical framework for understanding why we expect some voters to continue voting even after the hurricane devastated New Orleans. We then test three hypotheses.
First, we hypothesize that voters who incurred flooding would be less likely to vote. The flooding damage and related disruptions would, we think, increase the costs of voting for all voters. Second, aligned with the literature on which individuals are likely to vote, we anticipate that there will be interactions between the flood depth and the individual voter characteristics which are consistent with the hypothesis that some types of voters (individuals with low socioeconomic status, for example) will have a particularly more difficult time voting when the turnout cost increases. Here we will look carefully at the interactions between flood depth and particular groups to determine if we see patterns of which voters are most affected by increasing the cost of voting. Specifically, we predict that the flood most affected voters who have historically had a more difficult time casting a vote, and many of whom were unlikely to vote prior to Katrina -voters for whom an increase in the cost of voting is likely to make voting particularly difficult. Our concern with heterogeneous costs is that for these voters their higher levels of absence from the pool of eligible voters would significantly change the outcomes of the election and the quality of representation during the Katrina recovery. Finally, consistent with the literature on motivation, we hypothesize that, while flooding does decrease turnout, it does not do so in a monotonic fashion, and in particular, that those voters who experienced the worst flooding may in fact be the most likely voters.
We answer these questions with voter history databases that span twenty years of elections in New Orleans. These data were supplemented with Census data, and with data on the devastation caused by the hurricane collected by the Louisiana State University. We use voting data, economic and social variables, as well as information regarding the highest level of flooding that occurred by Census block throughout the city. This is the first study of its kind to use individual level data. In addition, we apply the most rigorous statistical methods possible to draw inferences about the effect of flood depth on participation. In particular we apply propensity score matching in order to compare individuals across flood depths, in a way that allows us to test whether the relationship between flooding depth and turnout is linear.
We find that flooding does decrease turnout, but contrary to our expectations, there are no statistically significant interactions between voter characteristics and flood depth.
Thus although voting is to some extent depressed in the post-Katrina era, there is some reason for optimism: we do not find that the effect of flooding is worse for particular groups. Most interestingly, for those with the highest levels of flooding, they appear to have been mobilized to participate in politics. We recognize that the literature in political science has typically considered participation to be determined by resources, recruitment, or motivation. Our findings here demonstrate the power of motivation and recruitment.
The Hurricane and Its Aftermath
Katrina hit New Orleans shortly before the city was to conduct a regularly-scheduled mayoral election. Incumbent Mayor Ray Nagin, who had first been elected to office in 2002, became internationally-known in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, due to his frequent television appearances and some concerns about his handling of the situation in New Orleans immediately after Katrina struck. Due to the concerns about his performance in office, by the time the municipal primary election season arrived, Nagin found that he had twenty-two challengers, including Lt. Governor Mitch Landrieu.
But the devastation left by Katrina raised many questions about whether the 2006 mayoral election should be held, when it should be held, and if held who would be able to cast ballots. The primary view among many advocacy groups was that the election should be either postponed or the election rules should be liberalized and modes of voting expanded to ensure that the displaced African American voters would be able to cast ballots in the election (AP 2005) . However, the problems with holding the election were as much administrative as racial or political. As the New York Times reported, "something as simple as sending a mailing to people in a district ... has become a logistical thicket.
Many of the address lists vanished when computers were submerged and, even if they could be found, the addresses were often meaningless" (Levy 2005) . Many community meetings regarding the reconstruction of the city and regarding relief services were held outside the city because of lack of appropriate facilities for public meetings and because of the population diaspora. Moreover, there were concerns that the returning population was primarily White, which could harm the electoral chances of incumbent Mayor Ray Nagin, who is African American. Instead, the Court decided that election liberalization legislation that had been passed by the Louisiana legislature was sufficient to ensure that the election would be fair. The liberalized election laws included allowing absentee voting for individuals who had never voted in person at a precinct. They also allowed voters to request a ballot by fax on election day, vote the ballot, and fax the ballot back on election day. In addition, voters who were displaced could receive a special exemption to the state's traditional ballot return requirements. Normally, ballots were required to be received the day prior to the election. For displaced absentee voters, their ballots could be postmarked on the day prior to election day if the appropriate affidavit were included with the ballot (Times-Picayune 2006). In addition, the state was given the authority to make modifications to the administration of the election that would facilitate voting in a devastated city. However, all legislative changes to the election, and several procedural changes, had to be approved by the Justice Department under the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Numerous new administrative procedures were adopted as well, either at the state or the local level. At the state level, Secretary of State Ater required that a chain-of-custody paper trail be created to track every action in the election in order to combat any litigation that resulted from the election outcome.
3 For example, all calls to the state's election hotline were tracked in a database and every absentee ballot was tracked using the 3 See for a discussion of chains of custody in elections.
United States Postal Service tracking service. Election officials also created a set of "mega polling places" that combined a large number of voting precincts into a single polling place (Thevenot 2006a) . The entire voter registration system was put online so that poll workers could help to get voters to the correct polling place and precinct. In addition to expanded absentee voting for displaced voters, some voters either drove or were bussed to participate in early voting in Louisiana (Filosa and Nolan 2006; Thevenot 2006b Hurricane Katrina raised dual concerns about voter participation in the mayoral election. One concern was that the displacement of voters itself would have a direct and negative affect on voters most affected by the flooding. Specifically, Katrina might impose a high cost of voting on those directly displaced by the flooding, because they would not necessarily have easy access to polling places or voting materials on election day. The second concern was that the complex array of procedures that were put in place to make voting easier for displaced voters might, contrary to their intentions, raise the costs and reduce the participation of the very individuals these procedures were designed to assist.
These concerns mesh well with theoretical models of voter participation, models that have been shown to have solid empirical foundations through decades of research. Seminal theoretical work by Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) articulated the notion that when it is more costly for an individual to participate in an election, ceteris paribus, the less likely it is for that individual to participate. This basic theoretical notion has been documented in a long line of work, beginning with the important contribution of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) . It and many later studies (e.g., Leighley and Nagler (1992); Nagler (1991) ) have shown that complex procedures can hinder the participation of many voters, especially those who many not have the resources necessary to overcome these hurdles. Verba, and Schlozman and Brady (1995) provided a deeper demonstration of the importance of resources -such as time, money, civic skills -that allow an individual to navigate the world of politics. Resource rich individuals are more engaged and interested in politics, and have connections to others that mobilizes them to participate. People who have resources, civic skills, engagement and connections to mobilization networks are much more likely to participate in politics. Congruent with this observation is the hypothesis that individuals who belong to particular groups tend to behave similarly -and many of those individuals who participate in politics report doing so because someone they knew asked them to participate. Similarity of behavior within a social framework is demonstrated across many classifications of social group structures, ranging from correlations in behaviors within urban ghettos and amongst home owners (Cutler and Glaeser 1997) . Although there may have been a decline in social capital among American voters (Putnam 1993 , the relationship of individuals to particular groups is a good predictor of individual behavior (Coleman 1990 ). Finally, and relatedly, there is recent research that combines some of these strands and argues that voting participation may be something like habitual behavior (Plutzer 2002 are affected by recruitment and increased motivational to express their political preferences. As Gerber and Green (2000) have noted, personal mobilization can play a critical role in improving turnout. In a multi-mode experiment, they found that face to face contacts can increase turnout by almost 10%. Although we have no data on efforts to mobilize Katrina victims -either those who were displaced or those who were able to remain in New Orleans -media accounts tell us that there were significant efforts to contact these victims using all three contact modes mentioned above. candidates also engaged in mobilization efforts; for example, incumbent mayor Ray Nagin campaigned in several surrounding states in order to rally voters and his campaign also conducted face-to-face campaigning in states neighboring Louisiana.
The Louisiana Secretary of State, Al Ater, also noted that the catastrophe should be considered a motivational experience for voters, encouraging them to participate in the election and in the subsequent rebuilding of the city. Ater stated, "If this whole crisis, this whole disaster doesn't motivate people, I don't think we're ever going to get them motivated, are we?" (Moreno 2006 Because it is possible that Katrina gave New Orleans voters a strong incentive to vote in order to hold their local elected officials accountable for their handling of the Katrina crisis, we hypothesize that highly motivated and frequently contacted voters will be more likely to turn out to vote. We are also able, within this data, to test theories of political motivation. Here we expect that increasing the depth of the flooding will increase the desire of voters to express their preferences. The motivational story here is expressive; the voters prefer to cast a ballot, and in fact their preference to do so may increase as costs increase. Although we anticipate a decrease in the chances of participation for voters affected by flooding, we anticipate that there will be a conflicting effect as well -some voters strongly affected by the flooding will be highly interested in casting a vote. In some ways, the simple descriptive data provide some support for the idea that despite the mas- This hypothesis -that turnout will increase with motivation and recruitment -is consistent with literature on the expressive act of casting a ballot. Scholars suggest that voters will be more likely to vote when the civic duty term is larger than the cost of voting; if for example, voting increases the likelihood of the preservation of a democracy (Downs 1957 , Riker and Ordeshook 1968 , Blais 2000 . Voters may also receive psychological benefit from voting (Schuessler 2000 , Brennan and Buchanan 1984 , Fiorina 1976 ).
Voting may be in this sense a consumption good where voters seek to express themselves and are not concerned about being pivotal but instead place value, for some particular reason, on the act of casting a ballot (Silver 1986 , Hinich 1981 . This motivation may come from a particular experience, for example, Blattman (2008) finds that child conscription in Uganda results in a 22% increased likelihood of voting as an adult. Here we test another hypothesis as well -that voters who are particularly affected by flood depth will have additional motivation to turn out to vote. We use a particular statistical methodology that will allow us to evaluate the probability of voting given that we hypothesize there may be a nonlinear effect of flooding on turnout.
Given the commentary that surrounded the election and its aftermath regarding the stability of representation in the city (Would Mayor Ray Nagin, who is African American, be reelected?) and whether the real or potential voting population would change because the voters are themselves different (such as fewer Democrats or African Americans in the voting population), these questions are highly relevant to understanding the impact of a highly disruptive natural disaster on a city's politics. These results have the potential to be highly generalizable in the following sense: in the post-9/11 world and in the current environment of global climate change, there is an increased likelihood that such highly disruptive events will occur in other places (e.g., Beck 1999 ). The 9/11 attack did disturb the mayoral election in New York City and, had it been more disruptive on Manhattan, it could have changed the voting population in the city.
Similarly, natural disasters like Katrina could easily disrupt elections in many large and diverse cities in the United States, including other major cities along the Eastern seaboard and Gulf of Mexico that are potentially susceptible to future hurricanes, cities along the Pacific Rim that are in active tectonic zones, and even cities throughout the interior which might see future elections disrupted by major natural or man-made events. As some commentators have noted, little has been done to plan for how such events might affect elections and even government transitions (Fortier and Ornstein 2004; Hall 2003; Kiewiet et al. 2008 ).
Data
The Louisiana Secretary of State's office provided us with a voter file dataset, including individual data on all registered voters in the New Orleans parish, which includes 238,627
individuals. This file incorporates data from all 17 wards, some of which, like the Lower 9th Ward are now, post-Katrina, ubiquitous for the amount of flooding they experienced; the file also includes wards that experienced no flooding whatsoever. As noted in the Appendix, the voter file was augmented using Census block group information from Census Summary Files 1 and 3. The variance in the extent of flooding, combined with the wealth of information observed both in the voter history file, and data observed at the Census block level, will allow us to evaluate the extent to which flooding caused by Katrina influenced voter behavior in New Orleans' recent mayoral election.
From this voter file, we observe, for each registered voter, the last twenty elections in which that individual has participated and when each voter registered. 9 From these two 9 Note that this is distinct from their participation in the last twenty elections -this variable records variables we produce a "propensity to vote" variable that is calculated as a percent of the elections in which the individual participated divided by the number of eligible elections.
In our dataset, the average voter propensity is 39.45% (with a standard deviation of 25%) and this variable takes values which range from 0 to 100%. This is the variable that we use to measure the effect of Katrina's flooding on habitual voters.
We also observe a number of characteristics about each individual. Much of the analysis thus far on Hurricane Katrina has dealt with aggregate data on turnout, race and district-level characteristics (for example, Logan 2006); this presents a problem commonly referred to as the ecological inference problem, where individual-level inferences are made using aggregate-level data. It has long been known in the social science research literature that individual-level inferences drawn from aggregate-level data are suspect, unless special care is taken to try to alleviate known biases in such ecological inferences (or the researcher uses individual-level data to make individual-level inferences, as we do). 14 The prior findings differ from our own for this reason -here we are 12 We dropped 1173 individuals who are missing age information in the registration file are dropped from all analyses and 4 individuals who had no registration date. The remaining individuals are excluded as we were unable to match their listed address to an address recognizable on a USGS map. 13 It is important to keep in mind that our population is registered voters, not the potentially larger population of New Orleans residents.
14 The methodological literature on the basic ecological inference problem is well summarized in Achen and Shively (1995) , and King (1997). able to draw valid individual-level inferences with individual-level data, and to do so with the most rigorous statistical techniques possible.
Flooding and Turnout
We 16 One possibility, which we explored due to a large amount of coverage in the media, was that the electoral consequences of Katrina flooding was due to a large extent to the particular ward effects. However, our findings indicate that is not the case. Although some wards sustained significantly different levels of damage and flooding, the average flood depth across wards is fairly constant. Looking at the percentage of registered voter households for each of the 17 wards that sustained more than four feet of flooding, this value varies only between 16-17%. Additionally, there are no great trends by ward with respect to flooding and turnout. This gives us reason to believe that in fact there will not be ward-specific effects in our analysis Mayoral vote = α + β 1 * X + where X is a matrix of voter characteristics that include flood depth after Katrina, gender, race, age, party registration, and propensity to vote and is distributed logistically. 17 and we focus on the flood depth on an individual level. In Table 9 we document the extent of more than five feet of flooding by zipcode and break this down into the percentage of individuals affected by more than five feet of flooding who were residents of blockgroups that were more than 50% black. We discern no clear patterns. 17 We also consider a model where we take the log of the flood depth variable with the concern that given the distribution of depth seen in Table 1 that we might anticipate this distribution would not have a normal relationship with the voting outcomes. A reasonable transformation is then to take the log of the flood depth variable, however, given the presence of zeros this is not directly possible. We first transform the flood depth (which ranges from 0 to 10) into a variable which is extremely similar, so that flood = .995 * flood depth + .005. We then take the log of this new flood variable. The coefficient from this model is similar in magnitude and statistical significance; thus we continue to simply use the absolute depth for ease of interpretation in our analyses.
We present the coefficients for each of the variables in Table 2 . We find that the coefficient on the flood depth is negative, as anticipated. As the amount of flooding increased, the probability that individuals would then be able to successfully cast a ballot in the mayoral contest should decrease, in large part because many of those residents were displaced by the flooding. This displacement should have increased the costs of voting, making it more difficult for voters to cast absentee ballots ahead of the election. Many organizations orchestrated bus trips to New Orleans so that voters could cast mayoral ballots and a bus ride from Texas to New Orleans, for example, dramatically increases the cost of voting.
We find that the coefficient on the gender variable is effectively zero (and not statistically significant) as is the coefficient for the nonwhite indicator. Surprisingly, the age variable is negative and statistically significant, but effectively zero (the coefficient value is -.001).
The variables that do seem to impact the turnout decision -other than the flood depth -are Democratic registration and vote history. The coefficient on Democratic party registration is positive, which is surprising as many of the neighborhoods which experienced the worst flooding were also majority Democratic. However, as the two main candidates in the runoff election were both Democrats (Ray Nagin and Mitch Landrieu), it is also possible that Democratic voters were more interested in the election. The coefficient on vote history is large and positive, which we would expect. The relationship between voting history and turnout is extremely strong but there is little correlation between voting history and flood depth (correlation coefficient is .024). As the flooding did not primarily then take place in neighborhoods with high voting propensities, it is possible that the votes cast in May 2006 are similar in terms of the types of individuals they represent to those cast in earlier elections. The vote history variable also captures a large amount of the variance associated with the other characteristics that tend to predict turnout (socioeconomic status, for example). Leaving this variable out of the model results in a large, negative, and statistically significant coefficient estimate for race, for example. The coefficients produced from this model are fairly consistent with those we would anticipate from the literature on turnout. We present the coefficients from a model estimated when excluding the vote history variable in the second column of Table 2 . From this table we conclude that in fact the depth of flooding decreases the probability that an individual casts a ballot in the mayoral election. Our next analysis will investigate whether or not any of these particular covariates interact with the depth of flooding. Consistent with what we find in the second column of this table, and although the vote history variable does capture a great deal of the variance associated with turnout, we will exclude it as it likely masks the effects of the flood depth and other characteristics. Table 2 Goes Here Our second analysis incorporates both the interactions between the water depth and the voter demographics, as well as a series of community characteristics. Thus our new model is:
where X is the identical matrix as described above, Z is a matrix of some of the variables in X interacted with the flood depth, and W is a matrix of community-based characteristics, measured at the block group level that includes the education level of the blockgroup, the median income of the blockgroup, and information on the type of housing (percent renter occupied) for the blockgroup. We assume is logistically distributed. We include these variables as control variables and use them as proxies for the individual data.
This analysis enables us to examine our second hypothesis -that the interaction of flood depth and vote propensity should be positively related to the probability of voting in the mayoral contest. Here we hypothesize that those voters who are nonwhite, Democratic, younger, and are residents of blockgroups with less education, more renters, and lower median incomes, will be more affected by flood damage. It seems unlikely that the additional costs associated with post-flood voting would be evenly distributed across groups. We present the coefficients from this model in Table 3 . Table 3 Goes Here Only one coefficient for the interaction is statistically significant -the coefficient between flood depth and Democratic registration -in Table 3 is not consistent. Our hypotheses about the effects of interactions are not supported here -in particular, the marginal effect of flooding for Democratic registrants is positive. For an additional one foot of flooding, the odds of a Democratic registrant voting would decrease less than for any other party registrant. Our other coefficients are sensible and consistent with the hypothesis that increasing flooding is likely to decrease turnout. In particular, in the second column of Table 3 , we exclude the blockgroup variables (since we know there may be biases introduced by using aggregate variables) and find results that are extremely similar.
One possible explanation for thee results is simply the fact that the flood depth effects may not be linear and additive. This seems likely given the difficulty in understanding the coefficients presented in Table 3 in the context of the traditional voter turnout literature.
It is likely that particular neighborhoods were affected disproportionately by the floodone component of this may simply be in the targeting, post-Katrina, of different categories of social services. We are cautious in using these results as we understand that we are effectively treating an ordinal variable as though it were continuous. Given this concern, we turn to a different technique.
In order to better analyze the true treatment effects of the flood variable, we apply a method for determining appropriate cutpoints for the effect of flooding on mayoral vote (Walter, Feinstein and Wells 1987) . First, we produce an indicator variable X K for each K feet of flooding, where X K = 0 if the flood depth is below K and 1 if the flood depth is equal to or above K. We incorporate each of these variables (X 1 through X 10 ) such that the model is:
where W is a matrix of voter characteristics that include gender, race, age, vote history and party registration, and each of the X K s is included with X 0 used as a base case and is distributed logistically.
We then analyze the results from this regression, in particular focusing upon the coefficients from each of the X K s. The interpretation of each of the coefficients for each of the X K s is as follows: the coefficient evaluates the relative impact of flooding between values k and k + 1 compared to no flooding. For each X K that has a coefficient which is itself statistically significant we determine that there is a true cutpoint at each of those values, so that in fact the probability that an individual votes in the mayoral election is affected by flooding between the two X K s with significant coefficients. After our analysis, we find that there are six X K values which qualify: these are flood depths of 1,2,6,7, and 9. We repeat the above model incorporating only those X K values. These results are presented in Table 4 .
Table 4 Goes Here
With this method, we are able to see the jumps in treatment effects because we are no longer constrained to incorporate the flood variable as both linear and additive. The coefficients for the X K variables range from positive to negative, implying that particular groups are often more affected by flooding than others. We observe a negative coefficient for flooding from 1-2 feet, but positive and statistically coefficients from 3 or more feet.
The range in coefficients appears initially quite unintuitive, but in fact it is simply likely that the flood increased the cost of voting for individuals in some categories but not in others. Although it is surprising is that there is such a positive and statistically significant effect of flooding depth on turnout for flood depth of 6 feet or more, it is possible that these individuals were simply more likely to turnout already -that, for example, their voting history indicated they were likely voters. These results indicate that there is indeed a non-monotonic effect of flood depth on turnout. As we present the results from our final statistical technique, we anticipate finding a non-linear and in particular non-monotonic result from the coefficients we observe in Table 4 .
We now turn to a final statistical technique which allows us to compare individuals directly with the fewest possible assumptions about the functional form used to describe the impact of flood depth. We have observed in the above results that a linear functional form was not appropriate, and furthermore we do not necessarily have a particular theory to motivate the choice of functional form. Therefore, in order to ensure that our results are not a consequence of our modeling assumptions, we apply a propensity matching method to the existing data, considering the treatment each individual received as the number of feet of flooding they experienced in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. We let t i indicate that registered voter i has been exposed to treatment t i , where t i can range from 0 to 10 in terms of depth of flooding. We observe the mayoral turnout, y i for each i, and, in addition, a series of covariates X i , where X i includes all individual-level covariates. Matching is necessary because t i and X i are not independent, for example, it seems likely that areas with higher median household income for example, there would be less flooding. We pre-process our data to eliminate the relationship between t i and X i : to do this, we must locate individuals across different flood depth values who have identical covariates and perform our analysis on these individuals only. Analysis on these individuals will return results that are similar to those from a randomized experiment and, to a large extent, there is little relationship already between the different treatment groups as the flooding from Hurricane Katrina struck without regard to many of the covariates included in our models.
We assess the differences in covariates by flood depth for the data before we pull out the matched sample. We look at the means of each covariate by flood depth. Table 5 presents these values for each of the covariates of interest by flood depth. Although there are differences which are apparent across flood depths, these differences are not large and are easily correctable via matching. Table 6 presents information on the quality of the match in terms of the percent improvement for each covariate for each treatment pair. Percentage improvement is measured as
where a is the balance before and b is the balance after matching. We only observe a decrease in the balance for two categories: for five feet of flooding, the percentage in the blockgroup who are high school graduates increases in terms of distance between zero feet and five feet, and for nine feet of flooding, there is a decrease in balance for the individuals who are registered as Democratic. Table 6 Goes Here
Another way to compare the matched and unmatched samples in order to understand the quality of the match is to evaluate the quantile-quantile plots. Here we present only one set of such plots, the remainder of which are available from the authors upon request.
In the figures below, there is little visible improvement to the dataset (these observations compare the flooding at zero feet with the flooding at one foot). However, in both cases, the balance is fairly close -most of the observations surround the 45 degree line -and given that this is the case, we have confidence in these estimates.
Figures 3 - Figure 5 Go Here
In our analysis of results based upon these data, we consider the treatment effect comparing zero flooding to flooding in each of the categories. Each individual flood effect is plotted as a comparison against the base category (no flooding) in Figure 6 , and the mean effects are tabulated in Table 7 . We observe an upward-trending curve for effects when setting each covariate at its mean. There is a decrease in the probability of voting with some flooding, but as the flooding increases, the probability that those voters cast ballots in the mayoral contest actually increases. The bars around the effects in Figure 6 indicate the 95% confidence intervals. We also calculate the mean effects for each flood category against the base case using a matched sample. Table 7 and Figure 6 Go Here
Our results indicate that flooding did decrease the probability of voting on average.
But we also show that voters who experienced high levels of flooding were more likely to get to the polls than those with lower levels of flooding. Most important, considering the claims of potential racial bias that holding the election would cause, controlling for race and other matched characteristics, voters that experienced the highest levels of flooding were more likely to turn out than the baseline population (zero feet of flooding). Referring back to Table 3, note that there is no statistically significant relationship between the interaction of race and flood depth on the probability of turning out to vote. We do observe a heterogeneous effect of water depth on the probability of casting a ballot in the mayoral contest, and this effect follows a upward-shaped pattern. We hypothesize that this pattern could be consistent with the efforts of a variety of voter mobilization campaigns designed to assist those voters who were most affected by the flooding in casting a ballot.
Conclusion
This paper presents an optimistic story about mayoral voting after Hurricane Katrina.
Voters whom the media portrayed as having likely higher costs of casting ballots are not seen here in this analyses to be negatively affected. Although flooding does decrease the probability that an individual casts a ballot, the relationship between flooding and race, partisan registration, and age are not key determinants of the likelihood that an individual casts a ballot. Interestingly, it is not the case that as we increase the depth of the flooding that this necessarily has a constant effect on the probability that an individual casts a vote.
By using appropriate modeling techniques, we are able to determine that the effects of flooding on the likelihood to vote is not linear. Individuals who live in areas that had large scale flooding were actually more likely to vote in 2006 than others who suffered less flooding. This finding suggests that, even though the costs associated with coping with the effects of the flooding for these voters was high, the direct costs of voting were lowered to the point that these individuals could vote in the election. Given the high level of interest in the election among interest groups, the candidates, and the media and the introduction of new voting procedures to minimize the costs of voting, such as vote centers, expanded absentee voting, and expanded early voting, both the informational costs of voting and transactional cost of voting were likely reduced. On the informational dimension, the media, interest groups, the candidates, and election officials in Louisiana all worked to reach out to displaced voters. The election reforms introduced reduced the transactional costs of voting. Likewise, the polarized racial dimension also may have increased the benefits of voting for low-income, African-american voters as well.
This findings distinguish this essay from much of the popular journalism on the impact of Katrina on the election. Rather than necessarily preventing those voters who had lost so much from participating, instead we observe that for the individuals who had experienced the worst flooding, they were in fact able to turn out and vote. The key component in our analysis is that we are able to use both individual data and the most rigorous statistical methods to draw our conclusions -the existing work has used aggregate data, and fallen prey to the ecological inference problems. Thus our findings also emphasize the need for methodological rigor in drawing social science inferences.
Our findings suggest that, in the aftermath of the Katrina disaster, it was possible to hold elections that were not biased against resource-limited voters. This normative finding should be comforting to those who were concerned that holding the election so close to the flooding disaster in New Orleans would systematically discriminate against the poor and minority voters. Through effective efforts to lower the cost of voting, and potentially an increase in perceived benefits of participating, the 2006 mayoral election allowed all voters including those most affected by the flood, to participate and shape the future recovery.
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Using the registered voters' addresses in the voter file, it is also possible to overlay US Census information. Specifically, we used Census block group information from the U.S. Census Summary Files 1 and 3. The census block data includes the number of housing units of rented in the census block, the median household income in the census block and the number of residents in the census block who are high school graduates. Census blocks are geographically compact areas which generally contain between 600 and 3000 people, with an optimum size of 1500 people. This data allows us to control for community effects which are likely to impact turnout. In Table 8 we present a summary of all covariates which we include in our analysis. These variables derive from both the voter file, the USGS flood data, and the U.S. Census. Table 9 provides descriptive information on flooding levels. Tables 8 and 9 Go Here .0017 * = .05, ** = .10 
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